Why God Is Probably a Guy

[Margaret McGhee]

Carey,

I said:

MM: I think our disgreement is one of perspective. I was pointing out that winning and losing are concepts that only exist in human brains. They are particular mental images that result from human consciousness and ego.

I saw nowhere in "Almost Us" where Calvin claims that non-human primates can hold complex concepts like winning or losing in their minds as mental images. He did note that orangs especially seem to conceptualize pretty well and can hide screwdrivers for later escape attempts, for example. That is pretty impressive. Planning is apparently one of the payoffs that comes with conceptualization.

Maybe the question is - would the orang hide the screwdriver so he could use it to escape because he saw his captivity as a contest with his keeper that he was determined to win? Or, did he just want to get out if that damned cage?

It seems like a pretty big leap in mental capacity between those two levels. It seems to me that a primate might need to develop the ability to communicate such complex concepts like that as they also developed the ability to hold them in their minds and were able to understand and share concepts like winning and losing with others.

But, I'm ready to learn something new. I could be wrong about what level of conceptualization I think a non-human primate is capable of. I agree that this is a variable along a curve and not an all-or-nothing question - and that some non-human primates are pretty far along that curve from mammals other than humans. But also, I think it's a pretty large range of ability we're discussing.

You seem pretty sure that I am wrong and I could be - but I notice you didn't provide any evidence either.

Margaret

[Carey N]

Margaret:

I think I haven't been very clear in conveying my perspective on this topic:

I do not disagree with you that humans are capable of conceptualization that far exceeds that of other primates, and I would never contend that any of the great apes other than ourselves can conceive of winning, losing, etc.

In fact, I would go one large step further and say that even trying to determine what Chimpanzees, Orangs, or any species other than our own is mentally experiencing is a probably a fruitless exercise. We ourselves are too predisposed to infer agency in the behavior of other animate (or even inanimate) objects that an objective evaluation of other animals' conceptualization capacity (whatever that actually means) is impossible.

The title "Almost Us" is a bit off, I think. Chimps, Orangs, and Gorillas may share a very recent common ancestor with humans, but to say that they are "almost us" implies that apes are an earlier point on an evolutionary trajectory toward the human species, which is conceptually and factually false. 1) Evolutionary trajectories do not have pre-defined end-points; there is no teleological component to the history of life. 2) Chimps, Orangs, and Gorillas are separate branches on the great ape tree - they evolved from a very recent common ancestor with humans, but nevertheless they represent adaptive fits to different environments, and so to compare humans' and apes' cognitive capacities is tricky business.

In my earlier post, I spoke of winners and losers in the DNA contest. In no way did I mean that the concepts of winning and losing are relevant to that interplay between replicating entities and the environment - those concepts are simply a way in which humans can understand natural selection. I would agree with Todd that the process of natural selection, and the facts that some reproducing entities "win" (i.e., reproduce) and others "lose" (i.e. die without reproducing) are totally independent of humans' ability to conceptualize winning, losing, or anything else.

If you look further back in the forum pages, you'll see a fuller explanation of my thoughts on natural selection - in the context of a duel with my buddy/nemesis, Fred. I believe the thread was started by Fred and pertained to Richard Dawkin's proclaiming that evolution by natural selection is a belief in the same way that religion entails belief.

Hope this has clarified my position on matters,

Carey

[Margaret McGhee]

Carey, Thanks for the clarification. Bill Calvin is a neurobiologist. He delights in seeing similarities and connections between different disciplines. Perhaps that's why I'm inclined to give him some slack when he finds intrigueing clues to who we are in similarities between primate species.

He is also quite critical of attempts to see connections where they are speculative and necessarily remote if they exist at all, like between quantum mechanics and mental imagery.

You said,

Chimps, Orangs, and Gorillas may share a very recent common ancestor with humans, but to say that they are "almost us" implies that apes are an earlier point on an evolutionary trajectory toward the human species, which is conceptually and factually false.

I have read most of his books, I have attended one of his lectures and have had conversations with him. I can assure you that by noting the advanced and similar ways that some primate species like us seem to use our brains - he is not implying that they are on the path to be like us - or that we humans are the winners of the "great primate brain race".

I can see where those who don't really understand evolution could get the wrong impression from the title and I think you make a good point. He'd probably appreciate hearing from you on that topic before he submits the book to a commercial publisher. He's at Apes.WilliamCalvin.com

Margaret

[Carey N]

Margaret,

Glad we're now closer to seeing eye-to-eye ...

Of course, I admire scientists with cross-disciplinary inclinations ... I'd like to be one myself. When broaching the fields of psychology and subjective experience, however, the risks seem to grow larger at an ever-accelerating pace.

Best,
Carey

[ToddStark]

Since I have not read any of Calvin's work, I will take your word that he's a bright fellow and a solid scientist. However, I still think that the title of his book belies a problem in his perspective.

Brief off-topic comment ...


I know Bill Calvin just a bit from neuroscience newsgroups he has participated on and of course his wonderful books. I will vouch for him as a very solid theoretical neuroscientist from my own perspective, a superb science writer and well worth reading. His theory of language syntax evolving from the capacity for fine movement sequencing is fascinating, as are his accounts of selective processes in the brain. His accounts of human evolution are interesting and plausible for the most part, I find. He has a good mix of speculation and empirical discipline in my opinion. I don't mind at all starting from his ideas as a launchpad for serious discussions.

Todd

[Fred H.]

Carey: Margaret: I think I haven't been very clear in conveying my perspective on this topic.

Hi Carey. I think the last we talked I was providing my insights regarding relationships with the opposite sex (and TomJ provide some dreadful advice that I advised you ignore). I think this interchange you’re having with Margaret offers us an excellent opportunity for us to resume—

You’re probably aware of the ex Harvard President, Larry Summers, fiasco—after making valid statements regarding women’s inherent inability to compete with men in areas of math/science, the Harvard radical feminists went ballistic, Summers foolishly backed off his statements, and allowed himself to be blackmailed providing the feminists $50 million for some bullshit study to determine why there aren’t more women in math/science; within a year he was forced to resign. The huge mistake Summers made was that he never should have backed off his original statements—for which the science and evidence is overwhelming—b/c it showed weakness; and once the feminists saw blood, Summers was history.

The point is this—your statement above that you’ve not been clear is nonsense—you’ve been abundantly clear with Margaret. The simple truth is that Margaret simply has an irrational, emotional aversion for those terms, “winning and losing,” and it has nothing at all to do with the validity of the points you made. So don’t back off bro, knowmsayin?

How’s your love life?

[ToddStark]

Fred,

I agree with you about Summers, his statement was awkward and not a particularly precise expression of the scientific consensus but not so terribly far off either that he couldn't have defended it better. I feel it is entirely supportable that we should study objective differences between genetic groups. It is unavoidable that this raises issues for policy, especially when the groups coincide with human identity groups. Obviously these issues are fraught with peril, but that doesn't negate the scientific and social value of understanding human differences. The fact that people tend to abuse biological knowledge doesn't automatically mean we shouldn't pursue it at all.

I think you may be unfair, or at least premature, in comparing this fiasco to Margaret's view, however. So far I see her view as much more reasonable than the way I perceive the radical feminist view, although it shares some similarities in principles.

Todd

[ToddStark]

Hi Margaret,

Thanks very much for your thoughtful response.

Are you suggesting that the chimp knows what the abstract meaning of winning is and it can be driven by a desire to not be seen as a loser among the band or that it wants to fulfill its own image of itself as leader among chimps - and not just by an emotional desire to intimidate other chimps? If so, can you provide a link to this research?

In this partcular argument, I'm not trying to make any point about the mechanisms of the chimp's decision making. I'm just saying that it represents the outcome of a fight in its nervous system, and not terribly differently than we do in some respects. We share enough phylogeny that meaningful comparisons are unavoidable. You and I obviously agree that this representation takes different forms in humans and chimps. I'm just saying that the representation has some commonality as well, it is not entirely symbolic in humans. This is a fundamental premise in evolutionary biology, the continuity of faculties in closely related species, due to the conservatvism of evolutionary adaptation.

I think it was the perceived implication that winning and losing are entirely human social constructions that I was responding to. I think they take on additional meaning to humans, but are also partly a result of the realities of mammalian social life.

As for beetles, not I wouldn't say that winning and losing are the same in the beetle world as they are in the mammal world. Their social environment is extremely different. Jeff Goldblum's character says in a memorable moment in The Fly ... insect politics just doesn't happen.

Events take on different significance to different species, but humans add a whole additional symbolic layer to that significance. My argument is that significance is not unique to humans, it is special in humans. It is linked to my argument that consciousness and "free will" are not unique to humans, but are special (different) in humans.

kind regards,

Todd

[Carey N]

Hi Fred

Your support is appreciated, but do take notice that I never backed down from my central message (i.e., that winning and losing are perfectly valid analogies for the way selection works); I just repeated my opinion to make sure Margaret understood what I was saying . . . the opposite of what Summers did.

It's hard to miss that you lose interest in a debate unless it's pretty vicious, and you escalate whenever possible. You, Fred, are a Hawk, while I'm a Bourgeois.

I admit that Margaret's fixation on what concepts, etc. can be held by what animal minds is a bit perplexing. The prospect of trying to know what an ape or any animal other than ourselves can "conceptualize" strikes me as complete nonsense, which is why I'm suspect of this Bill Calvin. "Almost Us" . . . ? That's what the lunatic animal rights protestors chant outside the zoology department every day.

-C

[ToddStark]

Originally Posted by Carey N

It's hard to miss that you actually lose interest in a debate unless it's pretty vicious, and you escalate whenever possible. You, Fred, are a Hawk, while I'm a Bourgeois.

I like Susan Haack's expression; "passionate moderate." I don't know if it describes you, but it works for me!

Originally Posted by Carey N

I admit that Margaret's fixation on what concepts, etc. can be held by what animal minds is a bit perplexing. The prospect of trying to know what an ape or any animal other than ourselves can "conceptualize" strikes me as complete nonsense, which is why I'm suspect of this Bill Calvin. "Almost Us" . . . ? That's what the lunatic animal rights protestors chant outside the zoology department every day.

I can't address Calvin's view either, since I have not read that particular book yet and it isn't as high right now on my list as a lot of other recent publications.

However, I will speculate on why someone in general might care about how concepts are represented in each species. It might matter because (1) it means that theories pertaining to animal data are less relevant to humans, or (2) it means that animal models are biased by using human terms. So for example we should not think of primate social behavior in terms of winning and losing fights because primates have a completely different way of representing such events.

I'll agree with some of the things Fred implied, that (2) seems to be related to epistemology of the social constructivist position, and one of the most common forms of social constructivism is found in the feminist epistemology. So maybe this is relevant to the current discussion or perhaps not. I'll chance it.

First, I again assert the position I took in another post, that of moderate scientific causal realism: we certainly might bias our stories by telling them in human terms, but our technical theories themselves are not narratives, they provide causal models. Part of the job of theory is to indicate where we've biased our explanations, and strip off the narratives and metaphors that we use so effectively in the context of discovery.

Second, addressing the feminist epistemology argument, our sex might bias us to see the sperm as a virile invader insinuating itself on the passive ovum, or conversely to see the ovum knowingly seducing the dimwitted swimmers. There is a reality beyond both these stories, specific things cause specific things. Either the ovum has signals to draw sperm in or it doesn't. The behavior of the sperm and ova can be objectively observed. The same is true for the behavior of animals and everything else.

We do tell stories about our theories and our stories do spin things in a particular way. I think it is entirely true that female scientists sometimes come up with a completely different way of thinking about something than male scientists, and that this sometimes leads to a new theory. My favorite examples are Lynn Margulis on symbiosis as a significant factor in evolution and Candace Pert on the role of neuropeptides in emotion. A reasonable claim could be made that the uniqueness of their theories is at least partly due to being women and seeing the patterns of evidence differently as a result.

However, the argument can only be taken so far. Feminist inquiry is not a different process than masculine inquiry, there is only human inquiry, approached by people with different talents and perspectives. In spite of differences, we share much more in the way our minds work than we differ in every way that matters epistemologically, in my opinion.

Stories are useful for thinking, and help formulate new questions to ask, but they are not logically required for explanations. Our causal explanations themselves are not inherently biased in the same way as the stories we tell about nature.

Sorry if this is a digression, it seemed to me to be one of the issues that people were circling around with all the comments about feminism and such.

kind regards,

Todd