Behavior OnLine Forums

Behavior OnLine Forums (https://www.behavioronline.net/)
-   Evolutionary Psychology (https://www.behavioronline.net/evolutionary-psychology/)
-   -   free will, determinism, and morality (https://www.behavioronline.net/evolutionary-psychology/871-free-determinism-morality/)

alexandra_k July 9th, 2006 09:20 AM

free will, determinism, and morality
 
the question of WHETHER we have free will isn't anywhere near as interesting as the question of WHAT free will consists in. are there such things as hunvudlgs? how can you even begin to answer that question until you have some notion of what the hell a hunvudlg is supposed to be? likewise with free will...

some people think that a good theory of free will will be a theory that allows that even if determinism is true we can still have free will. why do some people think that is a good constraint on a theory of free will? because determinism might well turn out to be true that is why. even if determinism is true we still want to have free will, however, and one way to ensure this is to define free will in such a way so that even if determinism is true then we can still have free will.

another consideration is that even if quantum indeterminacies are an irreducible feature of this world and even if those indeterminacies percolate up to the atomic level indeterminacies can always be recast in determinist form. instead of saying event E CAUSES event F instead we have event E CAUSES EITHER event F (probability 0.5) OR event G (probability 0.2) OR event H (probability 0.2) OR event I (probability 0.1). Instead of deterministic laws we might have such indeterministic laws but the overall picture still looks the same as the determinist picture (but with an added layer of complication).

So... What on earth might free will be?

I surely do believe that we are morally responsible for our actions. Oh yes indeedie. So what does that moral responsibility consist in? That I could have done otherwise? That isn't consistent with determinism so it wouldn't be a good idea to say that (if determinism turns out to be true then we wouldn't have moral responsibility). Even if indeterminism is true it wouldn't have been a good idea to say that. I can't cause the probability weightings to change (there is no hidden variable to affect the probability weightings) so that move isn't going to help... So what on earth might free will be?

Simple example (why am I getting a feeling of deja vu?)...

Elliot Sober talks about a weather vane... When the weather vane is free its movements are caused by the weather and it moves sensitively to register its environment. Similarly one might consider that when our beliefs and desires (and other mental states are free) is when they are caused by the relevant portions of the world and they are appropriately and sensitively registering the relevant aspects of our environment. When those features of us cause our behaviour (and we are not prevented by others, and when we don't have abnormal desires that aren't sensitive to our needs like compulsions and abnormal beliefs that aren't sensitive to the world like delusions) then WE ARE FREE!!! And morally responsible even...

I like this idea because... Whether determinism or indeterminism turns out to be true I can still have free will and moral responsibility.

In case god is the issue...

I am a bright:

http://www.the-brights.net/

Instead of my morality being based on 'god says i should do x so i shall do x' my morality is based on the golden rule (expressed as 'do unto others' in christianity). i have some brute parts to my ethics just as the religious person has some brute parts to theirs (that god exists that they know what god wants that the bible is the world of god). but one doesn't need to believe in god to be a good person and there is no correlation between being a member of an established religion (or not) and ethical behaviour...

TomJrzk July 10th, 2006 02:16 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
I like this idea because... Whether determinism or indeterminism turns out to be true I can still have free will and moral responsibility.

If my beliefs were based only on what I 'like', I would have hardened them long ago. My hardened beliefs are based on what I can prove; the rest of what I believe is based on my minimalist bent.

I know that you like the concept of free will, I would too. But I can't reconcile a belief in 'nothing supernatural' with something indeterministic. We can do nothing but what our brains tell us to do.

No, I don't believe that we can't ever characterize consciousness from mere neurons and their connections. WHAT ELSE IS THERE? And where does it reside?

So, you can not prove you have free will, no matter how much you want one. But you do have a responsibility toward our collective social instincts, if you don't want to be locked up.

Margaret McGhee July 10th, 2006 03:20 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Tom said:
Quote:

If my beliefs were based only on what I 'like', I would have hardened them long ago. My hardened beliefs are based on what I can prove; the rest of what I believe is based on my minimalist bent.
I offer this not in contradiction of what you say (as I understand where you are coming from, I think) but as a broader perspective in basic agreement. A different way to look at this is that your beliefs are based on what you like - in that all our behavior, including the adoption of hardened beliefs (perhaps, especially hardened beliefs) is the result of seeking that emotional payoff - that comes from satisfying our likes - and avoiding our dislikes.

It so happens that you, and some others here, like things that can be intellectually examined and that yield to some form of objective proof. This is not to say that you will always find that truth infallably - or that you will always have enough evidence to discern that truth perfectly. Just that you are happiest entertaining beliefs that seem, after careful examination, to accurately reflect the real state of the universe, as best you can determine.

This may seem pedantic, but it is really an important distinction - because the majority of persons out there don't share this like with you. Truths that approximate objective reality offer fairly small emotional rewards - compared with other truths that come from religion or magic or the minds of charismatic leaders. Is it more fun to believe that we evolved over millions of years in tiny steps that had no purpose or direction, that we are the result of a lot of chance and probability in the mixing of genes within a selective enviroment - or, that we come from seeds planted in the Andes by an advanced civilization from another solar system, 200,000 years ago? Well, I suspect I know your answer, but you can see my point, can't you?

Most of humanity have chosen the more emotionally satisfying rewards offered by those alternate views of the natural world. What causes a few, the minority, to eschew those easy pleasures for the harder to understand and much less celebrated truths of science?

These differences are not limited to the uneducated. Even among scientists I see a gradation in this dimension of belief. Many scientists pursue fields and proofs within them that align perfectly with their ideological beliefs. Michael Behe and William Dembski come to mind as perfect examples. But, even the best scientists probably have areas of belief that they protect from science. How many otherwise excellent scientists believe that homosexuality is an unnatural disease of the mind - rather than the overwhelming evidence that it's a normal behavior of complex evolved sexually-reproducing organisms. More than a few, I'd guess.

The interesting question for me, is not whether we are designed to seek emotional rewards for what we believe, as I can't see any other plausible mechanism for that, but what makes us different from each other in that regard. What makes some of us feel good when a scientist says that homosexuality is a disease of the mind - and others feel good when a scientist, like Joan Roughgarden, says the opposite - even regardless of the quality of the underlying arguments?

I suspect that some of us have developed a general antagonism toward superstitious belief. In my case I think I also have an antagonism toward mob-belief. I have never trusted groups of people who seem to embrace any belief system with a lot of emotion. I am especially distrustful of groups that claim the inferiority of minority or weaker groups - like Christians claiming that homosexuals are evil. I tend to be highly skeptical of whatever beliefs such ideologically motivated groups might advocate.

I admit that I would prefer to reject their beliefs and would prefer to accept uncritically those who contradict such beliefs. I'm not sure how good I'd be at being objective on such questions - although, of course, if I could claim to be honorably objective, no matter the outcome, that would make me feel good about myself. :rolleyes:

To me, this is an interesting area for further examination.

Margaret

Fred H. July 10th, 2006 09:45 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

MM: . . . your beliefs are based on what you like - in that all our behavior, including the adoption of hardened beliefs (perhaps, especially hardened beliefs) is the result of seeking that emotional payoff - that comes from satisfying our likes - and avoiding our dislikes.
I have to agree that this almost certainly is the case, for MM herself, that her “beliefs are based on what [she] likes - in that all [her] behavior, including the adoption of hardened beliefs (perhaps, especially hardened beliefs) is the result of seeking that emotional payoff - that comes from satisfying [her] likes - and avoiding [her] dislikes.”

Think about it.

alexandra_k July 10th, 2006 10:35 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Hey. There are a number of considerations or reasons for thinking that we have free will. Here is one of them:

> I like this idea because... Whether determinism or indeterminism turns out to be true I can still have free will and moral responsibility.

> My hardened beliefs are based on what I can prove; the rest of what I believe is based on my minimalist bent.

Sure, why multiply entities beyond necessity? If we can show free will to be 'nothing but' entities / processes that you thought existed already then we wouldn't be departing from minimalism, however. With respect to proof abductive explanations are often used with good scientific results. For example... Genes were postulated to play a role in theory well before scientists 'discovered' them. Here theory drives scientific investigation... It is easier to find something when you have some idea what you are looking for. We use arguements to the best explanation all the time... And as for faith... You have no reason whatsoever to believe the future will continue to be like the past. The only evidence you could possibly have would be from the past (and you can't appeal to the past to justify your beliefs about the future because that is precisely what is being called into question). Hume's paradox of induction... Shows that we often believe things that we cannot prove... I believe the sun will rise tomorrow... I believe the seasons will continue to flow... I believe I'll go to work tomorrow... All these are inductive. We figure the best explanation we have for observed past regularities is that there are underlying mechanisms / laws that will continue unchanging into the future. But isn't it just as rational to believe that those laws / mechansims will simply break down at midnight tonight or at any other time you care to name? No proof anyway... Scientists have to have faith as well... Just not (typically) faith in the supernatural.

Another consideration for why we want to have free will is because a fair few people think that free will = moral responsibility. What do they mean by moral responsibility? The notion here is that we can / should PUNISH people who do such things as rape and murder because they freely choose to do that and we should punish them for their choice. Some people think that if there is no free will then there is no moral responsibility so then we can't really blame or condemn anyone for raping and murdering etc.

That argument conflates a fair few related though distinct concepts... I believe in moral responsibility (in the sense that the weather vane is free when it is appropriately caused). I believe that people are responsible for their actions but I also believe in rehabilitation and not retribution. But anyway...

My main point here is that when you deny that free will exists you must mean something very specific by free will. What can happen is that people define their terms differently and proceed to talk past each other. Fun in its own way I guess... But In order for progress to be made...

By analogy... Behaviourists defined mental states in such a way... Then proceeded to show that there weren't any such things.

> I can't reconcile a belief in 'nothing supernatural' with something indeterministic. We can do nothing but what our brains tell us to do.

Our behaviour is caused by the state of our brain, sure. How would it be MY behaviour if it wasn't caused by the state of our brain lol. I should be extra explicit I am NOT trying to say that free will arises from quantum indeterminacies. My point with the quantum stuff was to say that you CAN'T derive anything for free will that wasn't present in the determinist world view. Quantum indeterminacies don't really help with free will. Hence better to stick to the determinist picture and see how free will fits into that.

> WHAT ELSE IS THERE? And where does it reside?

Well... Most theorists consider that there isn't anyTHING else... While most philospohers are materialists (the facts about consciousness can be deduced from the facts about the physical / material world) those who are dualists are property dualists rather than substance dualists. That is just to say that they don't think there is this immaterial non physical stuff that is the mind / soul. Rather they think that there are phenomenal properties (the feeling of pain, the experience of redness etc) that can't be deduced from a complete physical description of our world (including our brains and their relations to our world).

Where are these phenomenal properties? Well... They are thought to be non physical properties of the brain. So... They are in our brains. But it is true that they are experienced as being in the world. Have you heard of projection? Some people think we project the properties onto the world... Another way of looking at it is that the phenomenal properties are representational in the sense that the experience of a red tomato represents the world such that there is a red tomato in front of me. red1 is phenomenal red a property of my brain. red2 is the typical cause of red1 in normal observers under normal conditions. red2 has something to do with the surface spectral reflectance of the tomato. red2 is an objective property of the tomato, red1 is a phenomenal property of my brain.

> So, you can not prove you have free will, no matter how much you want one. But you do have a responsibility toward our collective social instincts, if you don't want to be locked up.

So we have moral responsibility.

As for proof...

Do you think you can prove the existence of the external world?

Should I have to prove teh existence of the free will comperably to how one can prove the existence of the external world?

I think both of us will appeal to argument to best explanation (abductive reasoning)

TomJrzk July 11th, 2006 09:24 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
So we have moral responsibility.

As for proof...

Do you think you can prove the existence of the external world?

Should I have to prove teh existence of the free will comperably to how one can prove the existence of the external world?

Yes, this is why I avoid philosophers. You know I mean social instincts and not moral responsibility.

And, yes, you should prove the existence of free will if you're saying that you know it exists. How do you know?
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
I think both of us will appeal to argument to best explanation (abductive reasoning)

While this might sound petty, it's not meant to be: I have a hard enough time deciphering your writing when I think the syntax is correct; I have no chance if you send replies without reading them over once. I'm assuming that these are not the words that were in your head at the time. This still gives me a headache when I look at it.

Fred H. July 11th, 2006 06:05 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

TomJ: We can do nothing but what our brains tell us to do.
Hey Tom, maybe you could explain, and “prove” (as you yourself are so fond of demanding) exactly how and what it is that tells “our brains” what to “tell us to do” (something more that just the typical superficial mention of evolved emergence from neurons and the natural selection of algorithms, neurotransmitters, etc.); and also explain who this “us” is if not “our brains” (in which case I guess you’ll start saying that our brains tell our brains what to do); and also explain, and “prove,” how it is that “our brains” also manage to trick “our brains” and/or “us,” including the most gifted and productive scientists and thinkers among us, currently and throughout human history, into thinking that we do indeed have some amount of freewill and moral responsibility, and how it is that you yourself know better, even though you yourself would have to be an automaton just like all the rest of us. Hello?

alexandra_k July 12th, 2006 01:26 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
I'm not too sure what you mean, that is why I'm kind of asking for clarification. Have you read 'Explaining Behaviourism' by William Baum? He outlines how behaviourists don't believe in libertarian free will and regarding what they say on free will... I'm in agreement 100%. Trouble is... When I say 'sure we have free will' I'm not talking about libertarian free will, I'm talking about a kind of free will that is compatible with determinism.

How do you know the external world exists?

To put a more modern spin on Decartes... How do you know that your brain wasn't removed from your body by evil scientists when you were 4? They could have placed your brain in a vat of nutrients and they could have attached electrodes to stimulate your brain in such a way that you have had the experiences that are indistinguishable from experiences you would be having were you to still be disembodied.

I'm not trying to trick you... I'm just trying to say that 'proof' can be hard to come by.

I can't prove we have free will (though I'll claim I can prove that we do not have libertarian free will). I can't prove that we have free will that is compatible with the determinist picture... I can't prove that we are morally responsible...

But I think we have chatted before about reasons to want a compatibilist version of free will:

People who committed suicide in the name of 'freedom'. Did they committ suicide for nothing? Was there no freedom for them to be fighting for?

Tell the slave that he can't complain about his slavery because nobody has freedom...

Let the serial rapist off because he wasn't free...

There are good reasons for retaining the terms 'freedom and dignity'. Despite Skinners rhetoric (heh heh).

If we don't follow the behaviourists on consciousness / mental states...
Then why follow then on freedom and dignity???

>> I think both of us will appeal to argument to best explanation (abductive reasoning)

> I'm assuming that these are not the words that were in your head at the time. This still gives me a headache when I look at it.

Because you don't understand what I'm saying?
Distinction: Deductive Reasoning / Inferential Reasoning
Distinction: There are two different varieties of inferential reasoning: The usual kind (what we typically mean when we say inferential reasoning) and abductive reasoning.

Examples:

DEDUCTIVE REASONING:
P1) If we don't have free will then people who died in the name of freedom died for an illusion
P2) They didn't die for an illusion
__________________________________________________ _____________
C) We have free will

This is a proof, but it will only work for you if you grant me premises one and two. I figure that if you are determined that we don't have free will then you will just reject (offer arguments against) either premiss one or premiss two or both.

INDUCTIVE REASONING:
P1) The sun rose yesterday
P2) The sun rose the day before yesterday
P3) The sun rose the day before the day before yesterday
================================================== =======
The sun will rise tomorrow

The premises are supposed to provide some reason to believe the conclusion. Hume offered a radical argument that... What reason do we have to believe the past is a good indicator of the future? Science makes use of inductive reasoning all the time... Consider

INDUCTIVE REASONING:
P1) People were selected at random
================================================== =======
C) We can generalise our finding back to the population as a whole

ABDUCTIVE REASONING:
P1) I am having experiences that seem to be systematic
================================================== =======
C) The best explanation for this is that I have causal contact with external reality

ABDUCTIVE REASONING:
P1) People talk about freedom a lot and they tend to value it highly
================================================== ========
C) While the folk notion (common conception) might be a little confused it seems that the best explanation for people valuing 'freedom' is that there is something worth having that we are capable of having that deserves to be called 'freedom'.

I can't prove that we have free will
Just like you can't prove that you are in contact with external reality.
The best we can do is offer arguments to the best explanation.

I think that the trouble we are having is mostly verbal.

You say we don't have free will because when you say 'free will' you mean libertarian free will.

I agree. We don't have libertarian free will.

But I do think we have free will because when I say 'sure we have free will' I mean compatibilist free will.

You disagree because you seem determined to read 'free will' as referring to libertarian free will and hence you miss the point of what I'm saying...

That a compatibilist position is possible.

And it is a verbal dispute...

Over whether what compatibilism gives us... deserves to be called 'free will'.

If you are interested in free will I'd reccomend:

"Elbow Room: Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting"
(Not only that but also varieties of free will that are possible for us to have)
Daniel Dennett... Well worth a read. If you are bold you could have a go at 'Freedom Evolves' too...

TomJrzk July 12th, 2006 01:19 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
You say we don't have free will because when you say 'free will' you mean libertarian free will.

Quote:

Originally Posted by wiki
In philosophical debates about free will and determinism, libertarianism is generally held to be the combination of the following beliefs:
  1. that free will is incompatible with determinism
  2. that human beings do possess free will, and
  3. that determinism is false

Great info, thanks. I'm different from libertarianism in that I say:
  1. that free will is incompatible with determinism
  2. that human beings do not possess free will, and
  3. that determinism is true
So I'm a hard determinist:
Quote:

Originally Posted by wiki
Hard determinism accepts both determinism and incompatibilism, and rejects the idea that humans have any free will.

And I think any discussion of free will that does not depend entirely on the state of the brain belongs right beside Astrology. I can accept compatiblism as your best current guess, but not stated as fact; for that, I'd need proof.

Margaret McGhee July 12th, 2006 04:15 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Just a quick question. When I consider this free will debate, it always seems to me to come down to whether or not human behavior is due to natural mechanisms inside the human central nervous system (even though we may not have a complete understanding of just how those mechanisms work physically) - or, whether there is some supernatural causation for human behavior - something that is beyond our neurons, synapses, neurotransmitters and other physical elements - some extraordinary mental force that can over-ride our physicality.

That's the end of the road I always find myself on.

I know where Tom and I sit on that question.

I'm not absolutely sure where Alexandra sits - although I would be very surprised that a Bright could seriously entertain supernatural causes.

I believe that Fred does attribute behavior to some supernatural mental force - although he's never described it and seems careful not to get pinned down on that. (Am I wrong about that, Fred?)

Free will almost means to me that we have a will that is free from our physicality. Although compatibalists use the term differently.

It seems to me that those who support some kind of supernaturally caused or abetted free will - have the burden to explain just how that supernatural effect comes to affect our behavior. We can see fMRI scans of brain regions lighting up as behavior decisions are considered and made. Where exactly is the supernatural effect inserted into that process?

Otherwise, what's the point of entering a scientific discussion in support of that view?

Any supernaturalists, feel free to educate me. Any naturalists, feel free to tell me why I may be asking the wrong question.

Margaret

alexandra_k July 13th, 2006 01:10 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
thanks, that really helped me understand your position :-)

> libertarianism is generally held to be the combination of the following beliefs:
1. that free will is incompatible with determinism
2. that human beings do possess free will, and
3. that determinism is false

and hard determinism (your view) is (as you said)

> 1. that free will is incompatible with determinism
2. that human beings do not possess free will, and
3. that determinism is true

okay. i am a compatibilist and thus i disagree with one. i think that
1. free will is compatible with determinism
i agree with the libertarian 2
2. human beings do possess free will
and regarding three I am agnostic, not wanting to commit either way
3. determinism might be true or there might be an irreducibly probabilistic element to laws of nature (either confined to the sub-atomic level or percolating up to the macroscopic level as well).

But I think that even if determinism is true it is still possible for us to have free will hence i am a compatibilist (otherwise known as a soft determinist).

> I think any discussion of free will that does not depend entirely on the state of the brain belongs right beside Astrology.

I agree!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

> I can accept compatiblism as your best current guess, but not stated as fact; for that, I'd need proof.

And I can accept incompatibilism as your best current guess, but not stated as fact; for that, I'd need a jolly good argument ;-)

So...

I think free will consists in ones mental states being caused appropriately by the world and ones actions being caused appropriately by ones mental states. I think... That is what free will is (a certain kind of causation) and hence... We actually NEED causation in order to be free and we actually NEED causation in order to be morally responsible. And thus... It is a good thing indeed that determinism might be true ;-) (and that indeterminism can be recast in deterministic form at any rate)

:-)

alexandra_k July 13th, 2006 01:30 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
> it always seems to me to come down to whether or not human behavior is due to natural mechanisms inside the human central nervous system (even though we may not have a complete understanding of just how those mechanisms work physically) - or, whether there is some supernatural causation for human behavior - something that is beyond our neurons, synapses, neurotransmitters and other physical elements - some extraordinary mental force that can over-ride our physicality.

That is what people initially think of as the debate and so I thought that was the trouble that I was having in my discussion with Tom. I agree with Tom that 'human behaviour is due to natural mechanisms inside the human central nervous system'. I think determinism may well be true, and even if it is false and indeterminism is true (because sub atomic particles seem to behave - perhaps irreducibly - in an indeterministic way) I still think that 'human behaviour is due to natural mechanisms inside the human central nervous system'.

The second part, the 'supernatural causation for human behaviour' is part of the libertarian notion of free will. Both Tom and I seem to agree that libertarianism is false. There is no supernatural causation for human behaviour. Maybe Fred disagrees with us on that.

I think that maybe Tom would be willing to grant that indeterminism might be true - but that the prospects for free will would be the same regardless of whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic?

I think that maybe Fred would be willing to grant that causation is due to physical causes rather than supernatural causes - so long as we can still have free will?

Thats why I'm trying to get clearer on what people are saying... So we can find the genuine points of difference (rather than the verbal ones). That way... We might actually be able to achieve something of a consensus... Or at least... Argue about the real points of difference rather than getting lost in verbal dispute....

Regarding non-physical causation of behaviour... One would need to deny that the physical world is causally closed (which seems to fly in the face of modern science though I suppose it is more of a presupposition than something they argue for).

Regarding supernatural causation of behaviour... The question I have for Fred is if my behaviour is caused by something supernatural instead of something that is due to the facts about the way I am, then how is the 'free act' MY act? How does it help to be at the whim of supernatural forces rather than at the whim of facts about the way I am?

Fred H. July 13th, 2006 07:32 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

MM: I believe that Fred does attribute behavior to some supernatural mental force - although he's never described it and seems careful not to get pinned down on that. (Am I wrong about that, Fred?)
Well MM, since you yourself believe, as you’ve asserted many times, that you believe only what feels good to you, and use your brains to justify it, and that so does everyone else, then whatever I, or anyone else, happen to believe, ultimately can have no more significance to you other than it happens to be whatever happens to “feel good” to us.

Be that as it may, I don’t recall ever having “attributed behavior to some supernatural mental force” (and if I ever did, wouldn’t that instead imply that we humans don’t have freewill after all?). However MM, since you yourself believe only what feels good to you, and use your brains to justify it, then you undoubtedly will believe that what I’ve “asserted” is whatever you happen to believe is what I’ve asserted, so long as it feels good to you, and then you’ll use your brains to justify it . . . so essentially, this has all been for naught. Hello?

Also, for those who don’t just believe only what feels good to you, “supernatural” seems to be another one of those meaningless terms since we don’t really know a whole lot about what exactly is “natural” (e.g., there are many interpretations of the “measurement problem” in QM, and what it implies regarding what’s natural or real; or since we really don’t truly begin to understand the how and why of human consciousness, we conjure up buzz words like “emergence” to mask our ignorance).

TomJrzk July 13th, 2006 08:43 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Wow, I think we're finally getting somewhere. Great posts, everyone!
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
I think that maybe Tom would be willing to grant that indeterminism might be true - but that the prospects for free will would be the same regardless of whether the universe is deterministic or indeterministic?

Yes, to both. Quantum uncertainty seems real as far as we can test, so, for all 'practical' purposes, there seems to be some rolling of dice. My intuition on that is there is some physical cause that we're currently unable to discern. Regardless, unless our will was free to affect (and/or effect) that uncertainty, it's only 'unfree and very slightly random'. I say 'very slightly' because I don't see the percolation to the macro level.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
The question I have for Fred is if my behaviour is caused by something supernatural instead of something that is due to the facts about the way I am, then how is the 'free act' MY act?

IF I can argue for the perspective we might be wrongly attributing to Fred: my concept of their view is that humans possess and control that supernatural force, so it is entirely their act. But, of course, this force is at least in large part affected by railroad spikes in the brain as well as repressor and regret modules, so it's probably entirely natural.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
But I think that even if determinism is true it is still possible for us to have free will hence i am a compatibilist (otherwise known as a soft determinist).

This just sounds like an oxymoron to me. How can anything be free if it's deterministic? If your only concern is ethics, then you might be comforted by this quote that much better says what I've been attempting to convey:
Quote:

Originally Posted by wiki
That is, a person with the character of a murderer has no choice other than to murder, but can still be punished because it is right to punish those of bad character.

The human race is like a living body. It has all sorts of constituents that are often at odds; the stomach would digest the whole body, all cells dump pollution into the environment, etc. It's not a melanoma's fault that it is cancerous, but it must still be removed from the body.

So, a question: if will is truly free, why are so many more men in prison than women? Are men just inherently less 'moral'? Or is prison not a good measure of morality?

Fred H. July 13th, 2006 09:21 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

[TomJ to Alex:] So, a question: if will is truly free, why are so many more men in prison than women? Are men just inherently less 'moral'? Or is prison not a good measure of morality?
Let me get this one for you Alex—

Unfortunately Tom, it seems that a higher percentage of males are jerks—some are perhaps genetically predisposed, some may have had lousy upbringing, some apparently can think only with their penises and/or have too much testosterone, some just choose to do illegal and/or bad things for whatever reasons. And the rest of us, who understand the obvious fact that we adult humans must be morally responsible, and are morally responsible, enforce our morality and will on the misbehaving individuals and punish them (except that we generally don’t punish children, animals, machines, or the truly insane); and sometimes we even execute the more egregious offenders.

TomJrzk July 13th, 2006 09:37 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by Fred H.
a higher percentage of males are jerks—some are perhaps genetically predisposed, ..., some apparently can think only with their penises and/or have too much testosterone, ...

Think, Fred. Think about what you just wrote.

Did each man choose how much testosterone he 'wanted'. Did they choose their genes? How can you punish someone who was born with a high level of testosterone and praise someone who was born with none (relatively)? It was not their choice.

They should be prevented from more antisocial behavior but no parent would condemn their son to burn in hell for eternity if he had less control than his harp-playing sister.

Think.....think.....think.....think.....think..... ..thiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiink.

alexandra_k July 13th, 2006 09:49 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Er... I'm not sure how much it helps discussion to parody / caricature / scoff at other peoples views, rather than attempting to engage with them.

Do you think that Margaret caricatured your views on freedom? I'd be interested to talk about libertarian free will and reasons why I don't believe in supernatural causation (in fact I think Tom wants to discuss that too).

There is indeed trouble with how to characterise the natural vs the supernatural. I like this quote from Tye:

'There have been any number of different ways of understanding the term 'natural'. So different philosophers have had very different conceptualisations of what it is to be a naturalist about a given domain, for example, the mental. The intuitive idea, I suggest, is simply that, on the naturalist view, the world contains nothing supernatural, that, at the bottom level, there are microphysical phenomena, governed by the laws of microphysics'..
'Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational theory of the phenomenal mind', Michael Tye.

And basically that once god fixed the micro-physical facts and the laws of nature (whether they be deterministic or indeterministic) he fixed all the natural facts about the world. (If you fix the physical facts then you get the chemical facts for free and the biological facts for free and the psychological facts for free etc). God only needed to fix the microphysical facts and the laws of nature and then he could rest. All the physical facts were settled :-)

(One can worry about facts about consciousness, ethics, mathematics, logic and so forth... These might be non-natural phenomenon... I guess one might want to argue that they are super-natural phenomenon... Interesting questions about whether these facts can cause changes to the physical world e.g., can we grasp mathematical facts? Ack. I'm giving myself a headache).

He also talks about different senses of emergence. There are different notions of emergence, I was just wanting James to clarify what kind he meant so I could engage with his views a bit more...

alexandra_k July 13th, 2006 10:52 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
> Wow, I think we're finally getting somewhere.

:-)
Yep.

> Quantum uncertainty seems real as far as we can test, so, for all 'practical' purposes, there seems to be some rolling of dice.

The best physical theory we have at present... seems to involve... Some rolling of dice, yes.

> My intuition on that is there is some physical cause that we're currently unable to discern.

That is the 'hidden variable thesis'. Physicists have looked and looked for the hidden variable/s... They haven't found any at present. If they did... Then they wouldn't be 'hidden' anymore lol. It is possible that there is a theory of physics which wouldn't make use of probabilistic laws, and it is possible that there isn't one. The physicists are trying to find / construct one though, yes.

> Regardless, unless our will was free to affect (and/or effect) that uncertainty...

It can't do that. The probability weightings are objective. If 'free will' was causing a possible event to become actual then free will would be a hidden variable. If free will wasn't natural then it wouldn't be able to cause changes to the physical world (unless you deny that the physical world is causally closed which is one of the major assumptions of physics).

> IF I can argue for the perspective we might be wrongly attributing to Fred...

Sure. I'll just say that you are going to play devils advocate for libertarian free will.

> humans possess and control that supernatural force, so it is entirely their act.

So then states of my brain cause the supernatural force to cause my actions. Why bother with the supernatural force? What role is it playing? Why not just say that states of my brain causes my actions? The latter theory is simpler... Why multiply entities beyond necessity?

But maybe it is that I freely choose my beliefs and desires? Then the trouble is that we seem to want our beliefs to be caused by the world (so they are true) and we seem to want our desires to be caused by what our body needs / what is good for our body. How can I choose my beliefs and desires? Does that mean my beliefs and desires cause my beliefs and desires? What causes the first lot? Further beliefs and desires? Problem of the infinite regress...

>> But I think that even if determinism is true it is still possible for us to have free will hence i am a compatibilist (otherwise known as a soft determinist).

> This just sounds like an oxymoron to me. How can anything be free if it's deterministic?

Because I maintain that free will JUST IS a certain kind of causation.

I'll try and put it simply...

P1) 'Free will' means one could have done otherwise (according to libertarianism)
P2) If determinism is true then one couldn't have done otherwise.
__________________________________________________ _______
C) Either 'Free will' does not mean one could have done otherwise, or we do not have free will.

So... If our everyday concept of 'free will' entails P1 and we grant P2 (for simplicity because indeterminism won't help us anyway) then we have a decision to make. We can either deny that we have free will, or we can revise our concept of free will. I vote for conceptual revision.
The conceptual revision buys us COMPATIBILISM (if determinism is true then we can still have free will)

P1) 'Free will' means that one freely chooses ones beliefs and desires.
P2) Uncaused beliefs and desires could not have been freely chosen by me
[If something is uncaused then how can it be MY free choice?]
__________________________________________________ ______________
C) My freely chosen beliefs and desires must have been caused by me
[What can this mean except that they were caused by my previous beliefs and desires?]

This argument is designed to show that the notion of something uncaused being caused by me is deeply incoherant. If the common sense conception of freedom requires that something can be freely chosen by me yet that it not be caused by me then it is incoherent. We either revise the concept or we don't have free will. Again... I'm all for conceptual revision.

Hence... It is looking as though... Causation is required for freedom...

[Of course beliefs are often caused by the state of the world and desires are often caused by body states such as the state of thirst and the desire to drink. These beliefs and desires are not typically thought to be ones we freely choose to accept, however, they seem to be more passive... Caused by the state of the world and ones body respectively]

The conceptual revision buys us GENES + ENVIRONMENT CAUSES OUR BELIEFS AND DESIRES (with no supernatural intervention) and that is okay :-) In fact... The above argument was supposed to show us that we jolly well want that to be the case really... Beliefs and desires that we 'freely choose' are beliefs and desires that were caused by other beliefs and desires that we have. Eventually this must bottom out at the beliefs and desires that are NOT choosen by us (they are caused by the world) otherwise we would have an infinite regress of beliefs and desires.

One last shot:

P1) 'Free will' means that one freely chooses ones actions.
P2) Actions that aren't caused by me can't be freely chosen by me.
__________________________________________________ ___________
C) In order for an act to be freely chosen by me it must be caused by me (by my beliefs and desires)

Hence... 'Free will' seems to require causation (by me) once again...

I'm having trouble seeing how free will can't REQUIRE determinism (or something like it).

But I guess I've revised my conception of free will...

Why? Because it is a choice. Either we revise our concept of free will (so that it is something worth wanting: Ie something that it is possible for us to have) or refuse to revise our concept and conclude that we don't have free will.

I've chosen conceptual revision (that is the soft determinist line)
Others choose not to revise their concepts (that is the hard determinist line, these people would rather say that we don't have any free will - by which they mean libertarian free will).

Why do I choose conceptual revision? Because ultimately... I think that is more in line with our common sense conception... Ask the man on the street 'do we have free will????' and you will get a resounding YES!!!!! Basically... Something has to give.

But seems the dispute is really over whether we should revise our concept of free will (we have learned something of its nature huh). Or whether we should refuse to revise our concept - but then I'd like you to say something about how that is really more in keeping with common sense given the man on the streets resounding YES OF COURSE I HAVE FREE WILL!!!!!

Then... An account of how 'free' and 'not free' is used in law...
Then... An account of how 'free' and 'not free' is used in ethics etc...

'Cause if we don't have 'free will' then what distinctions are these people really drawing? Or are they just saying meaningless words?

alexandra_k July 13th, 2006 11:07 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
An analogy:

Descartes radical scepticism... What moral should we take from that?
IF knowledge requires certainty then the only thing we can be certain of is the cogito therefore we can't have knowledge of anything other than the cogito.
So... Either certainty isn't required for knowledge or the only thing we have knowledge of is the cogito. You choose... It is counter-intuitive to deny we have knowledge of everything other than the cogito, it is counter-intuitive to deny that certainty isn't required for knowledge. Personally I think it is more counter-intuitive to say that the only thing we can have knowledge of is the cogito hence I revise my concept of knowledge so that certainty isn't required for knowledge. A lot of philosophy works like this... That is why it is important to get clear on what people mean by their terms (like 'knowledge' and 'free will').

And what that means... Is that I can't PROVE that we have free will (I'm not certain that we have it. I'm not certain of anything aside from the cognito and that contradictions cannot be the case). But I think we can KNOW that we have free will even though I can't prove it... Though... All hinges on what you mean by free will ;-)

The free will case shows us (most plausibly IMO) that uncaused beliefs / desires / actions aren't free. What is actually required for me to be free is for ME to cause my acts hence for my acts to be caused by ME hence... Free will actually REQUIRES causation.

Free will JUST IS a certain kind of causation.

The main research project within philosophy... Is trying to spell that out in more detail (necessary and sufficient conditions for the 'right kind' of causation).

Margaret McGhee July 13th, 2006 12:02 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Alex:
Quote:

Free will JUST IS a certain kind of causation.
Yeeeeeessss.

Behavior has cause. Obvious, no? Emotion is what I propose as the functional cause of behavior. (That is my very broad definition of emotion.)

Our awareness of emotion (feeling) is secondary. It (feeling) can cause us to think about our behavior - propose alternatives, evaluate them logically, etc.

But, the emotion itself (without the feeling) can cause us to do that as well. We can just find ourself considering various college choices, for example, not really seeing the TV show we are watching at the time - without noticing that we are feeling anxious because we haven't made a decision yet - without realizing that our thoughts were generated to eliminate that anxiety.

Strange coincidence (Cue Rod Serling's voice here): Another Alexandra (last name Doonesbury) just went through an agonizing college choice dilemma in May that was only resolved in favor of MIT by the votes of over 152,000 concerned fans. Most of the fans' comments took the form of logical justifications for their various alma maters - an obvious emotional choice emanating from their identity beliefs IMO ;).

There were strong suspicions that MIT computer science students had hacked the vote in the best Diebold tradition. Another indicator of the strong ideological emotions involved in this historic event.

Margaret

TomJrzk July 13th, 2006 12:13 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
> the man on the street's resounding YES OF COURSE I HAVE FREE WILL!!!!!

Then... An account of how 'free' and 'not free' is used in law...
Then... An account of how 'free' and 'not free' is used in ethics etc...

'Cause if we don't have 'free will' then what distinctions are these people really drawing? Or are they just saying meaningless words?

Yes, this whole conversation started with 'the illusion of free will'. It feels like we make choices, in fact we mull over alternatives and 'choose' the 'right' one; but that's all an illusion. But we still rely on everyone's mulling, otherwise, mull-less decisions would result in a different, but deterministic result. So, our brains are an integral part of the future that is destined. That's why I don't scream from the mountaintops; this subject is easy to get confused by, and I don't need a bunch of nihilists running around.

I had hoped that my quote on 'character' would clear up the moral/legal ramifications. Even if someone has no 'ultimate' control over decisions, they can and must still be held accountable for the sake of the human organism; we're only here, in my opinion, because we have evolved social instincts that caused us not to kill each other. So far. Our offensive weapons far exceed our defenses, and have for a long time.

So, we don't have any need for free will (Occam's Razor), we have 'Evolved Psychology'! Hey, maybe someone should start a forum on that topic! ;)

Fred H. July 13th, 2006 02:35 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

TomJ: Think, Fred. Think about what you just wrote.

Did each man choose how much testosterone he 'wanted'. Did they choose their genes? How can you punish someone who was born with a high level of testosterone and praise someone who was born with none (relatively)?
Well Tom, look at it this way: Bill Clinton seems to have had a lot of testosterone, but I still think he could have chosen to refuse that infamous Oval Office BJ . . . hell Tom, even Hillary believed that he could have chosen differently. (OTOH Tom, I’ll have to admit that since Bill Clinton does seem to be a pathological liar, maybe he really didn’t have much “choice” when it came to him perjuring himself regarding said Oval Office BJ.

Be that as it may, I’ve noticed, Tom, that you yourself often tend to be somewhat impulsive, especially after one of my occasionally, albeit admittedly, provocative posts, when it seems that you unthinkingly respond with whatever brain-fart happens to pop into your mind (like you did here with the above nonsense). So as an experiment, to prove to yourself that you actually can exercise some self control, self restraint, freewill, next time you feel provoked, count to one billion, take a few deep breaths, and then attempt to respond intelligently rather than emotionally.

TomJrzk July 13th, 2006 02:45 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by Fred H.
to prove to yourself that you actually can exercise some self control, self restraint, freewill, next time you feel provoked, count to one billion, take a few deep breaths, and then attempt to respond intelligently rather than emotionally.

Yes, that was the kind of thinking I expected of you. I'm sorry to have bothered you; I knew full well that you could not be other than what you are.

Margaret McGhee July 13th, 2006 02:59 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Possibly a major source of misunderstanding about my premise is that most people think of emotion as feelings, as something one notices. I believe that almost all the underlying emotions that influence our behavior go by un-noticed.

I believe that we are constantly awash with emotions that don't rise to the intensity that we notice them - yet they are continuously guiding our behavior, determining what we think about and the conclusons we reach (which are also behavior).

Again, this is a trick of consciousness. Consciousness makes us think that the only things that happen in our CNS are those things that we are consciously aware of. Therefore we know what we think about - and we are aware of emotions as feelings, but only when they become intense enough that they obviously affect us or when they seem to interfere with our thinking.

Consciousness is an egotistical process. (Would Freud say that was redundant?)

Margaret

alexandra_k July 14th, 2006 12:35 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Okay. Did you follow what I said about conceptual revision? Sorry... I probably tried to cover too much ground in one post.

Clarification of points of difference:

The common sense notion of free will seems to require that one 'could have done otherwise'.

You think that it is too counter-intuitive for us to revise our concept of free will so that free will just is a certain kind of causation.

I think that it is too counter-intuitive for us to revise our beliefs about free will so that we come to believe that we don't have any.

Compatibilists think we should revise our concept...
Hard determinists think we should revise our beliefs about free will...

> Then... An account of how 'free' and 'not free' is used in law...
> Then... An account of how 'free' and 'not free' is used in ethics etc...

If nobody has free will then why is it that some people get sent to mental institutions / get compassionate sentances (because we judge they are not free) while others face sentances to the full extent of the law (because we judge that they acted freely)?

The compatibilist can say that these 'free' and 'not free' distinctions refer to whether there was appropriate causation of behaviour or not.

And... You could agree... It is just that you think it is more counter-intuitive to conclude that 'free' and 'not free' refer to appropriate causation than to conclude that there is no such thing as free will. I disagree. I think it is more counter-intuitive to conclude that we don't have free will.

I would say that mulling over alternatives compared to reflexive responding is a freely chosen / not freely chosen distinction. Reflecting makes an action freer than an action that is done in the absense of reflection. Sure our process of reflection is a process of causation but that is okay. Causation is necessary for free will.

> So, we don't have any need for free will (Occam's Razor)

Occam's razor is a metaphysical principle: 'don't multiply entities beyond necessity'. If I posited such a thing as a non physical immortal soul as the seat of our free will then I would be multiplying entities beyond what is necessary to explain the phenomenon.

When we say that chairs and tables exist we aren't multiplying entities beyond necessity because chairs and tables are nothing over and above microphysical phenomena that is subject to the laws of nature. Likewise when I say that we have free will I'm not multiplying entities beyond necessity because free will is nothing over and above microphysical phenomena that is subject to laws of nature.

I think conceptual revision (so free will requires causation) is more in line with common sense than belief revision (so that we don't have free will).

TomJrzk July 14th, 2006 08:52 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Philosophy for the feeble-minded. Thanks, that actually helps a lot.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
You think that it is too counter-intuitive for us to revise our concept of free will so that free will just is a certain kind of causation.

I think it's more than counter-intuitive, I think it's unfair. You just seem to be redefining the term 'free will' to cover the illusion of free will. So, now I can't say that free will is an illusion? That's just not the tack I would have taken.

I can certainly agree that the illusion of free will is just as important to our collective, uninformed sanity as truly free will is. Unless every person takes that extra step and understands that it being an illusion changes almost nothing, hopelessness sets in. That's where you got the completely untrue notion that people dying for freedom would have died for nothing; let's discuss this further if you don't understand what I'm saying. And this half-understanding of determinism is where the problem lies, in my opinion.

An imperfect analogy is that religion as a concept and a property of the human condition is real though all religions, themselves, are false; a behavior based on myth is still a behavior, and one that can be scientifically studied. Religion is real. And people operating under the illusion of free will is real. I think you want to call that realness 'free will'. That's as close to your concept as I can bring myself.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
If nobody has free will then why is it that some people get sent to mental institutions / get compassionate sentances (because we judge they are not free) while others face sentances to the full extent of the law (because we judge that they acted freely)?

That's complicated, but perfectly clear to me. First, it informs my opinion that all anti-social people should be treated as if they're insane, what's wrong with just separating offenders from their temptations instead of punishing them? That would certainly be best but most expensive, which leads to the second point: as a shortcut we punish offenders to 'make examples of them'; the punishment adds another fact to the brains of the rest of the population when they're weighing whether to do the right or wrong thing. We give a 'bye' to those that are deeply insane (or can act like it) and punish those that are mildly insane. Yes, I would call everyone 'at least mildly insane'. And I hate nobody, even Fred, because it's not their fault; they can not help who they are.

So, there is less distinction in my book between free sane people and unfree insane people; they're differences in degree, not kind. I feel a need to treat pedophiles humanely because I have no urge to treat children that way, so who am I to judge? Would I be in their shoes if I had their urges? I think so, and I think you would, too. I'm not 'better' or 'more moral' except by the accident (too harsh a term with evolution factored in) of geneology.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
Occam's razor is a metaphysical principle: 'don't multiply entities beyond necessity'. If I posited such a thing as a non physical immortal soul as the seat of our free will then I would be multiplying entities beyond what is necessary to explain the phenomenon.

You're not positing such a physical thing because you're avoiding the task of explaining exactly how free will arises. If you ever got there, then you'd HAVE to posit something physical. I think that's Chapter 11211 in the Bright handbook ;). (A very unfortunate term, BTW; way too arrogant so I can't support it.)

Oh, and I finally remembered: I wrote something in an earlier post about avoiding philosophers within a paragraph and I meant in the context of whole posting. So, I was complaining about the contrast in left-right thinking as a whole; not implying that I had problems with you redefining my point. Sorry.

alexandra_k July 14th, 2006 10:26 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
> You think that it is too counter-intuitive for us to revise our concept of free will so that free will just is a certain kind of causation.

> I think it's more than counter-intuitive, I think it's unfair. You just seem to be redefining the term 'free will' to cover the illusion of free will. So, now I can't say that free will is an illusion? That's just not the tack I would have taken.

If you were to say 'libertarian free will is an illusion' I would agree 100%.
Libertarian free will is an illusion. But you know what? The libertarian notion of free will (an uncaused act / belief / desire that is somehow 'freely chosen' by ME) is deeply incoherant so as to not be worth wanting anyway. What could 'could have done otherwise' mean except that HAD my beliefs and desires been other than what they were I would have been caused to do something different from what I did in fact do?

I sympathise with the notion that I seem to have played some verbal trick...
I agree that the majority of the population think they have libertarian free will and that the majority of the population are thus under the illusion that they have libertarian free will when they can't have any such thing (and nor would they really want it).

But I still think it is more counter-intuitive to say that we don't have free will than to simply say that we have learned something about free will and seems that free will requires causation after all. When we thought that free will was incompatible with determinism we just had some false beliefs about free will is all. When we thought a free act was an uncaused act we just had some false beliefs about free will is all. Turns out free will is a little different than we had supposed.

I mean... Empirical investigation teaches us new things about the world. We come to learn that some of our beliefs were simply mistaken. Reasoning about things (such as free will) can teach us new things about our concepts too. We can come to learn that some of our beliefs about them were simply mistaken.

I think we are in agreement regarding offenders. I'm all for rehabilitation rather than retribution. I think I am very lucky indeed not to have pathological desires. I have sympathy because I think that if my consciousness was associated with your body (and seems to be random that I got to be associated with mine) well then I would be along for your ride. I'd be experiencing your regrets and your dreams and your hopes and so forth. I have sympathy for most people because I think I could have very well been them.

> there is less distinction in my book between free sane people and unfree insane people; they're differences in degree, not kind.

Sure. And I grant that acts are more or less free. Which is to say they are more or less caused in the appropriate way (yet to be specified). But we aren't going to make progress on how to specify the relevant kind of causation if I can't get you on board the project in the first place. Freedom is relative.

I am sitting in a chair I decide to leave the room I get up from the chair and leave the room. Free or not free?

I am tied to a chair I decide to leave the room but I can't untie myself so I don't leave the room. Free or not free?

I want to say 'free' in the first case and 'not free' in the second case. What would you say about those?

I decide to shoot Paul in the head so I shoot Paul in the head. Free or not free?

You hold a gun to my head and tell me that if I don't shoot Paul in the head then you will shoot both of us in the head. I believe you. I shoot Paul. Free or not free?

Should there be different sentences in those cases? I would say that in the first I should go to jail whereas in the second I shouldn't go to jail but you should.

A certain kind of deer never strays more than 2ks in any direction from its place of birth. Bambi is born in the middle of an enclosure 20ks wide. Is it free?

A certain kind of deer never strays more than 2ks in any direction from its place of birth. Bambi is born in the middle of an enclosure half a k wide. Is it free?

I think revising our conception of free will allows us to make 'free' and 'not free' judgements that are in line with the way in which we typically use the terms. You could do a survey and see whether the majority of people would say that certain cases are free while other cases are not. Whereas you have to say 'not free' in every single case... I still think your theory is more counter-intuitive than mine ;-)

> you're avoiding the task of explaining exactly how free will arises. If you ever got there, then you'd HAVE to posit something physical.

I've been explaining a little. Free will arises from causal processes between the world and mental states and between mental states and the world. Mental states can be explained in terms of brain states. Brain states can be explained in terms of micro-physics. Mental states and brain states and micro-physical entities and causation are entities that probably appear in your science too, however, so I don't end up with any more entities than you in order to explain free will.

Great discussion :-)

TomJrzk July 14th, 2006 11:20 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
I am sitting in a chair I decide to leave the room I get up from the chair and leave the room. Free or not free?

I am tied to a chair I decide to leave the room but I can't untie myself so I don't leave the room. Free or not free?

I want to say 'free' in the first case and 'not free' in the second case. What would you say about those?

Of course:
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
Whereas you have to say 'not free' in every single case...

When you decided to leave the room, your decision was based on the state of your brain; you were hungry and bored so you went to the fridge. Or maybe you wanted to prove to me that you could decide to leave the chair, but that, too, was based on the state of your brain. Of course, you're going to agree with this but still contend that you had freedom. If it's freedom from the brain you're talking about then you have to show 'with what'. If it's not free from the brain then it's not free, just the result of electro-chemical reactions.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
Should there be different sentences in those cases? I would say that in the first I should go to jail whereas in the second I shouldn't go to jail but you should.

Sure, but it's a matter of guilt (they even say 'guilty by reason of insanity'), and that is a measure of your character, which should be taken into account when jailing is considered. You didn't have an ultimate choice but neither did I; I obviously should be separated from society, though.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
I've been explaining a little. Free will arises from causal processes between the world and mental states and between mental states and the world. Mental states can be explained in terms of brain states. Brain states can be explained in terms of micro-physics. Mental states and brain states and micro-physical entities and causation are entities that probably appear in your science too, however, so I don't end up with any more entities than you in order to explain free will.

Once you get to the ultimate detail, you'll understand my point. Or show the physical embodiment of this will that is free and I'll thank you for that.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
Great discussion :-)

Amen! ;)

Fred H. July 14th, 2006 11:59 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

TomJ: And I hate nobody, even Fred, because it's not their fault; they can not help who they are.
How wonderful that Tom does not hate even Fred . . . but then by Tom’s reckoning, he really cannot help being so wonderful, can he? (Tom needs to check my theorem on circular BS.)

Anyhoo, regarding punishment and incarceration, my own view is that most drugs should be legalized, controlled, and taxed (like alcohol and tobacco), education provided on the evils of drug abuse, rehabilitation programs made available, and any prisoners incarcerated only for drug offenses should be released (thereby substantially shrinking the population of our overcrowded prisons). Then everyone should be informed that they themselves are responsible, morally and otherwise, for their choices and behavior; and anyone refusing to accept or acknowledge that they do indeed have moral responsibility for their choices and behavior, should immediately be incarcerated . . . b/c that’s almost certainly where they’re going to end up anyway (plus there’ll be all that extra prison space from having released the drug offenders).

TomJrzk July 14th, 2006 12:38 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

Originally Posted by Fred H.
he really cannot help being so wonderful, can he?

No, I can't. I'm just REALLY glad that I am so wonderful. It makes my life very pleasant.
Quote:

Originally Posted by Fred H.
that’s almost certainly where they’re going to end up anyway

You're forgetting about our social instincts. We're social animals and like to have friends. We like to be respected. We like to be a part of a conversation where someone says, "Great conversation". We like to have religious people agree with us. We're uncomfortable when someone is unfairly hurt. And on, and on, and on.

I've had plenty to keep me from jail. So far... ;)

Again, we make choices that suit our characters; but those choices are pre-determined (though not necessarily predeterminable), so there is no free will. And, again, a thorough understanding of determinism makes one more hopeful for the future, not buried in helplessness.

Fred H. July 14th, 2006 02:40 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

TomJ: And, again, a thorough understanding of determinism makes one more hopeful for the future, not buried in helplessness.
I’ve heard similar sentiments from Presbyterians/Calvinists and various religious fundamentalists, although they call it predestination—the absolute sovereignty of God as opposed to your atheistic absolute sovereignty of the (unconscious, purposeless) forces of nature . . . amusing that religious fundamentalism and atheism have that commonality, and probably why I often find both camps to be equally annoying, not to mention arrogant and foolish.

BTW Tom, regarding your “social animals” concerns, I understand you can “have friends” in prison too, especially if you enjoy anal sex . . . and if that’s something you’ve not yet experienced, I understand it only hurts the first time.

TomJrzk July 14th, 2006 02:56 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
And you still think your wife's problem with your "perspectives on things" is irrational? Do you call her 'arrogant' and 'foolish' when she's right, too?

It's time to up your meds and/or have Shelley edit your postings, again...

Fred H. July 15th, 2006 10:44 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
. . . how clever . . . it’s not the heat, it’s the banality.

alexandra_k July 17th, 2006 07:41 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Clarification of points of difference (I do find these useful!)

YOU: It is too counter-intuitive to say that we have discovered that free will requires causation, we are better off saying that we have discovered that there is no such thing as free will.

ME: It does sound a little odd, but it is not really so different from finding out that the sun isn't the centre of the universe after all, and that there are black swans, and that the speed of light in a constant. Theories change over time.

YOU: It doesn't matter so much that we don't have free will because we can have moral responsibility without having free will.

ME: Now how counter-intuitive is that? Now you are asking us to revise our concept of moral responsibility! I would say that that is every bit as counter-intuitive as saying that we should revise our concept of free will! So why do things my way rather than yours? Because it allows us to agree with all the judgments that the folk make about certain acts being free, while certain other acts are not free whereas you want us to make the 'not free' judgement in every single case which is very counter-intuitive indeed.

Our view of the world is the same. We seem to agree on the causal processes in the world. The causal process from genes + environment to inner mental states to other inner mental states to behaviour. We seem to agree that that causal process is determined by microphysical properties of the world and the laws of nature that will come to be unearthed by physics. Our view of the world is the same.

What we are getting hung up on is what term to use to refer to part of it.

I say 'lets call that free will' and you say 'lets not'.

The dispute is solely verbal.

TomJrzk July 17th, 2006 08:47 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Great posts, thanks!
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
YOU: It doesn't matter so much that we don't have free will because we can have moral responsibility without having free will.

ME: Now how counter-intuitive is that? Now you are asking us to revise our concept of moral responsibility!

I would say we have 'genetic' responsibility to at least to humans. We wouldn't have gotten this far if we didn't have some genetic predisposition to the survival of our species. And banding together as social animals requires us to have 'rules' (we couldn't sleep at night, otherwise); those breaking the rules are called 'immoral'.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
The dispute is solely verbal.

OK, but your perspective can easily be twisted to support religious views; in fact, it's hard not to. There's nothing concrete about 'emergent properties' stemming from 'complicated neural patterns' or whatever effects any freedom in will. Sounds just like 'spirit' to me because I see no basis in physics. Sure, intelligent minds argue this but I think it comes from the same source: some unwillingness to stick with just the facts, for whatever reasons. In the meantime, honest people hear the illusion and attribute that to the supernatural.

We have these brains that give us the illusion of choice, but there is no other power beyond the firing of neurons; to that you agree. You may then want to call the decisions that we appear to make (all of which are completely dependent on the current state of the brain) 'free will' but that's something I can not do. It's just not intellectually honest to me.

It's better that people understand the truth: there but for a different brain go I. It sure helps me not to hate anyone. It helps me not to envy anyone. It helps me not to blame anyone. It helps me keep everything in perspective.

Whether you 'decide' to agree with me or continue to disagree; the future of humans depends directly on that 'choice', and every other 'choice' you and I make. The future depends on us all making the decisions that we will make, and a better future depends on us making better decisions. If that thought causes one person to realize that the future is in their hands, rather than based on the whims of some imaginary 'god' then my decision to write those words affected the brain of that person, which set the future on it's predermined course, since I was destined to write those words.

Hopefully, each of us 'decides' to leave a better future as our legacy.

Fred H. July 17th, 2006 09:55 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

Tom: It doesn't matter so much that we don't have free will because we can have moral responsibility without having free will.

Alex: Now how counter-intuitive is that? Now you are asking us to revise our concept of moral responsibility!
Yeah Alex, but you’re being kind when you say it’s “counter intuitive”—it’s actually intellectual dishonesty, or possibly schizophrenia.

alexandra_k July 17th, 2006 10:00 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
I agree with your characterisation of moral responsibility. In those cases I cited before (tied to a chair / not tied to a chair etc) then you would make 'morally responsible' and 'not morally responsible' judgments. I agree. We could both go one step further and say that the reason why the person is morally responsible in one case is because their actions were determined (or caused) by their beliefs and desires, whereas in the other case the person is not morally responsible because their action was not caused by their beliefs and desires (there was outside causation that prevented that from happening). I go one step further, though, and say that the person who was morally responsible was free and the person who was not morally responsible was not free. You resist attaching the label 'free' to appropriate causation. You thus ask people to revise their beliefs about how free will is required for moral responsibility.

>> The dispute is solely verbal.
> OK, but your perspective can easily be twisted to support religious views.

I can't be answerable / responsible for what conclusions people reach when they 'twist' my view into something it is not. That being said I'd like my view to be agnostic (neither requiring nor denying God) for the reason that... There might just be a supernatural force behind the world. I'd also like to convert both atheists, religious folk, and the rest to my view rather than alienating myself from groups of people.

> in fact, it's hard not to.

Points of difference:

- Most (though not all) religious folk have a libertarian conception of free will that requires that one 'could have done otherwise' in the sense that determinism is incompatible with free will. I've made it clear I don't agree with that.
- Most (though not all) religious folk have a libertarian conception of free will that requires that a free act is uncaused. I've made it clear I don't agree with that.
- Most (though not all) religous folk have a notion of this non-physical / immaterial substance (the soul) that can cause changes in the physical world and that is the seat of our free will. I've made it clear that we do not need to posit an immaterial soul (and indeed I haven't posited one).

To twist my view into an endorsement of those things would be to twist it indeed...

> There's nothing concrete about 'emergent properties' stemming from 'complicated neural patterns' or whatever effects any freedom in will.

I'll tell you what I mean by an 'emergent property'. It is a property that an object has that none of its parts has when considered in isolation. An analogy. Water is H2O. It is a structured arrangement of H2O molecules. If you consider an H2O molecule it does not have the property of liquidity. If you have a bunch of H2O molecules with certain kinds of bonds then the resulting substance has the emergent property of liquidity, however. Liquidity is a physical property, but it is also an emergent property. Beliefs and desires are also emergent properties of our neurons in the sense that they are physical properties that no particular neurone has when considered in isolation but something (along the lines of a pattern of activation) exhibits the emergent property of being a belief. A shop is also an emergent property. So is money. They are all physical properties so there is nothing mysterious going on. If we know all the microphysical facts about the world and all the laws of nature we can deduce the emergent properties (well we could if we were ideally rational with unbounded cognitive capacity). Hey, maybe that is how God does it :-O
;-)

> You may then want to call the decisions that we appear to make (all of which are completely dependent on the current state of the brain) 'free will' but that's something I can not do. It's just not intellectually honest to me.

Some would consider it intellectually dishonest to say that one can have moral responsibility without free will. Intellectual honesty / dishonesty aside (it isn't about that really) it comes down to a choice as to how we are going to use our terms.

> It's better that people understand the truth: there but for a different brain go I. It sure helps me not to hate anyone. It helps me not to envy anyone. It helps me not to blame anyone. It helps me keep everything in perspective.

I grant you all of that. But for a different brain go I. I agree. Your view gives me that the same as my view gives me that. Our world views are the same. It is just that your reccomendation calls for significant revisions in how we use language if we want to speak truthfully. People say things all the time (in courts of law as well) such as 'so and so acted freely' and 'so and so did not act freely'. You would have us say that all claims of the form 'so and so acted freely' are false. I can allow us to distribute truth conditions as usual. I can also allow us to keep our 'free will is required for moral responsibility' as a true belief. On my view we just need to rethink what we mean by freedom (in the way I have outlined). On your view language needs a more radical overhaul and I can't see what your view buys us that mine does not but yours calls for a more considerable review of language than mine does. Hence... Mine makes the best sense. I mean sure scientists could have said 'turns out that there isn't any such thing as the sun, 'cause everything revolves around the sun but really everything doesn't revolve around that'. But so much simpler to say we have learned something new about the sun. Scientists could have said (about 'all swans are white' upon discovering a black swan) 'wow we have discovered a new species of animals and now we shall revise a lot of our beliefs about species in terms of being related and interbreeding and so on and so forth'. But so much more consistent with current theorising to say 'we have learned something new about swans - some of them are black'.

> Whether you 'decide' to agree with me or continue to disagree; the future of humans depends directly on that 'choice'...

But it is a dispute over a name. It would be like scientists arguing (about black swans) lets call that a naws, it is a new species vs lets say that swans can be black after all. They aren't really arguing about how the world is, they are arguing about what to call a certain part of it. Nothing hangs on it but... A name. And... A reccomendation for future linguistic practices (and how truth values should be distributed over sentances involving 'free will' or 'swan' or 'species' or whatever.

> Hopefully, each of us 'decides' to leave a better future as our legacy.

I agree. Except in my case... I can leave out the scare quotes...

TomJrzk July 18th, 2006 09:29 AM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Great post, I agree with almost everything you wrote; no, that's not why I think it's a great post ;).
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
Water is H2O. It is a structured arrangement of H2O molecules. If you consider an H2O molecule it does not have the property of liquidity.

But, we can understand that the molecule's structure makes it polar, thus the extra attraction that gives it liquidity. I'd love to see an analog for the emergent property of free will; then I'd believe it.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
But it is a dispute over a name

I can't see what your view buys us that mine does not

I think it brings us a lot of clarity: people are not ultimately responsible for their actions but we must react to and control some of their actions for the sake of the future. Plus, we can think of someone as being unfortunate rather than evil.

Finally, I think it is right, will is simply not free. You could say something about will being free from 'outside' influences, if you did, I'd have to consider it. I'd be able to agree with you if it truly was free, but you're not even arguing that. You want to be able to say "free will" for historical purposes when we now know that there is no soul or spirit that could effect that freedom; if someone loses the regret module in their brain, their character, soul, spirit is instantly changed. You want to talk about a free will that's not free.

If people understand that there is no free will, they are much closer to believing the truth (as far as we know it): that there is no god. As long as scientists use the term "free will", and don't show its ultimate cause, even I am apt to insert 'soul'.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
I'd like my view to be agnostic (neither requiring nor denying God)

I, too, am an uncommitted atheist (I got slammed by an atheist for calling myself an agnostic). The original dictionary definition was something like "one who believes that god is unknowable", it may have been redefined since.
Quote:

Originally Posted by alexandra_k
I can leave out the scare quotes...

I prefer to call them 'so called' quotes ;) ;).

Fred H. July 18th, 2006 08:10 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
Quote:

TomJ: I think it brings us a lot of clarity: people are not ultimately responsible for their actions but we must react to and control some of their actions for the sake of the future. Plus, we can think of someone as being unfortunate rather than evil.
Alex, do you see what I mean by Tom's intellectual dishonesty, his utter lack of any kind of rigor—by Tom’s reckoning here, Hitler and Stalin were “not ultimately responsible for their actions,” and they were “unfortunate rather than evil” . . . next he’ll spray Pine-Sol on a turd and insist it’s a Christmas tree.

Also Alex, if you’re still wondering why I “post these kinds of posts,” it’s b/c, at least in this case, no one is calling Tom on the obvious and ugly implications of his half-ass “rationalizations.”

Margaret McGhee July 18th, 2006 08:56 PM

Re: free will, determinism, and morality
 
I invite the reader to observe the high emotion expressed in Fred's post. IMO - whenever this happens it is almost given that someone's strongest identity beliefs have been challenged and probably insulted.

Fred's posts are often emotionally charged (as are mine sometimes) and provide good examples for my premise.

I think this also illustrates the strong need of those who are psychologically conservative to hold others "to account" for whatever bad things they percieve to happen in the world - as if dire and painful punishment is the only balm that could erase whatever damage has been done - that could make the world right again.

Fred refuses to acknowledge Tom's qualifying term "ultimately". To acknowledge that, Fred would have to allow some blame to be lost - and another chance to make the world right would be squandered.

What Tom is saying is that if a dog were raised under a brutal master, intimidated, beaten, taught to be vicious, and rewarded only when it attacked - and if that dog were to injure someone some day, then ultimately the dog could hardly be blamed in terms of right and wrong. Perhaps, for the good of others the dog may need to be euthanized but the concept of evil does not exist for the dog.

But, that's how Tom means "ultimately" in this context. Ultimately, the dog can not be held morally accountable for its actions. The concept of human free-will allows Fred to escape such analyses where people are concerned. He may even admit that dogs can't be evil - but he is absolutely certain that people can. Because, they have free-will.

Tom is just saying, and I would agree, that people may do bad things, but ultimately they can only do what their minds dictate. Every behavior decision is the result of some negotiations that occur between the neurons and chemicals in the brain - and those are there because of genetics and that person's experiences in life - just like that dog's are. There is no ghost in the machine that we can blame. We can call bad people evil and we can punish them, we can even execute them. Tom may even agree that some terrible killer should be executed for the practical good of society.

But, I'm sure that Tom (and I) would say that that was unfortunate. It was unfortunate that a person's mind devoloped in such a way that they did such terrible things - and that at some point, according to the rules set up by our society, they had to be executed. I imagine that Fred would likely say that it was good that the world was set right by such a dire consequence and the killer deserved it.

I think this illustrates an important break in the psychological development of human minds - the conservative / liberal break. My purpose is not to say that Fred is wrong and Tom is right. Instead, I'd just suggest that such a psychological bias exists in most of us. It causes us to develop our belief systems in certain predictable ways. Those belief systems then generate the reliably conservative or liberal emotions that determine how we see the world and the conclusions we come to about things. Those emotions are what ultimately guide our behavior. And we're all pretty good at using our brains to justify that behavior.

Added on edit: I think it's important to add that we often compartmentalize our belief system. We might see capital punishment as wrong, a fairly liberal position. At the same time we might see same sex marriage as immoral, a socially conservative belief. I suspect this happens when specific learning experiences are strong enough (such as strong emotional experience when we were young) to overcome a general bias we may have developed in one direction or the other.

My apologies to both Tom and Fred if I mischaracterized either of your views on these things. ;)

Margaret


All times are GMT -4. The time now is 08:28 AM.

Powered by vBulletin® Version 3.8.11
Copyright ©2000 - 2024, vBulletin Solutions Inc.
Copyright © 1995-2023 Liviant Internet LLC. All rights reserved.